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“Silence! Peace in Progress”: The 2013 Election and Peaceful  
Post-Election Dispute Management in Kenya 
 
Akanmu G. Adebayo and Muthoni K. Richards 
Kennesaw State University 
 
On March 4, 2013, Kenyans went to the polls to elect the president, vice-president, senators, county 
governors, and members of parliament. Tension was high; fears and uncertainties gripped the nation, and 
the international community watched with keen interest. Five years earlier, on December 27, 2007, a similar 
event had resulted in a horrific post-election violence (PEV) that left thousands dead and hundreds of 
thousands displaced, and that disrupted the economic and social conditions of the country and the entire 
sub-region. As the 2013 elections approached, the fear became palpable that there might be a recurrence. 
Those fears were unrealized; Kenya had an election that the Commonwealth Observer Group, among other 
observers, reported to be “credible” and to have met “many of the benchmarks for democratic elections to 
which Kenya is committed.” Based on a series of interviews conducted in Kenya in June-December 2013, 
this paper evaluates the factors that contributed to preservation of electoral and post-election peace (PEP) 
in Kenya. 
 
Keywords: Uhuru Kenyatta, election, Kibaki, Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), 





Kenya didn’t have a perfect election in 2013. In fact, 
there is no such thing as a perfect election in Africa—
or anywhere for that matter. But Kenya’s post-
election dispute management in 2013 was markedly 
different from the previous election. It was deliberate 
and decisive. Although the two weeks of widely 
televised Supreme Court proceedings over the 
election petitions were tension-filled, the process 
prevented mass violence as the petitioners accepted 
the Court’s ruling as final. This paper examines the 
factors that promoted a peaceful resolution of the 
disputes over the presidential election in 2013. These 
factors are numerous and multifaceted. They 
included peace activism by government and ordinary 
citizens; the horrifying memory of the recent post-
election violence of 2007-2008; and the pressure of 
the international community, including the shadow 
of the International Criminal Court.  
 Other factors were the increased confidence in 
the electoral management body, the Independent 
Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC); the 
performance of security agents in managing tensions 
in the period leading to the 2013 general election; 
and the adoption of a new constitution which, 
through devolution, shifted some of the powers 
hitherto concentrated in the central government to 
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the Counties. Still other factors were the vibrant 
social media which absorbed most of the irreverent, 
inflammatory statements shocks, as disputes that 
ordinarily would have been vexed on the streets were 
taken online; the civil society organizations and 
opinion leaders that worked hard to educate and 
mobilize the citizenry towards a more peaceful 
conflict resolution; and the increased confidence in 
the Supreme Court, especially in the newly 
appointed justices. The paper looks closely at several 
of these factors and draws lessons for post-election 
dispute management in similar African countries. 
 Relying mostly on interviews conducted between 
June and December 2013, the paper presents 
Kenyans’ thoughts and reflections about the 
country’s efforts in 2013 to hold its general elections 
and manage the results with minimal violence. 
Methodologically, the authors combine specific 
approaches from history and social sciences 
disciplines. The authors review and examine 
government and political party publications, selected 
civil society records, independent commission 
reports, and citizens’ opinions published in 
newspapers and social media for their historical 
information relevant to the subject. They also review 
the existing literature to inform and validate this 
study’s findings. In addition, they conduct oral 
interviews and focus group discussion. The research 
design took the form of semi-structured interviews; 
the bulk of these interviews were conducted in 
Nairobi in June 2013,1 and the last one in 
Washington D.C. in December 2013. A purposive 
sample of participants was generated by referral. A 
total of fifteen participants were interviewed. In 
addition, a focus group discussion (FGD) was held at 
the Africa Leadership Center in Nairobi. The 
location of interviews ranged from participants’ 
offices and homes to hotel lobbies and an airport gate 
(as the participant was traveling out of the country). 
These hour-long interviews (by average) were 
transcribed and, subsequently, analyzed for common 
and dominant themes and responses. Participants 
were given pseudonyms; Table 1 presents a list of 
participants by pseudonyms. 
 The small sample size is a major limitation of the 
study. However, since the study is exploratory and 
hypothesis-generating, the interviews do not 
constitute the main source of information. Moreover, 
in evidence from oral interviews and focus group 
discussion are triangulates with evidence from the 
literature and published sources. The result is a truly 
robust exploration of the factors that promoted the 
experience of post-electoral peace in Kenya in 2013.  
 







Timothy 6/27/2013 Scholar, contestant in 2007 
election 
George 6/21/2013 Journalist, writer for 
newspapers and social 
media 
Najib 12/16/2013 Top-ranking IEBC official 
Pius 6/20/2013 Pastor of a leading, non-
denominational church in 
Nairobi 
Sarah 6/20/2013 Presidential candidate in 
2013 election 
Aaron 6/26/2013 Scholar, pastor, leader in 
Christian Council of Kenya 
Joshua 6/21/2013 Chairman of a commission 
established in 2008 by the 
government to promote 
peace and co-existence 
Moses 6/21/2013 Kenya’s influential 
ambassador 
Naomi 6/24/2013 Attorney, head of civil 
society that champions 
constitutional rights, law, 
and justice in East Africa 
Isaiah 6/21/2013 Scholar, head of a major 
leadership training center 
Barnabas 6/20/2013 Renowned artist, peace 
activist 
Mwendwa 6/25/2013 Top-ranking IEBC official 
Martha 6/25/2013 Attorney, head of civil 
society that champions 
transparency, governance, 
and electoral credibility 
Peter 6/24/2013 Presidential candidate in 
2013 election 
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REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
 
The unholy connection between elections and 
conflict in Africa has been the subject of numerous 
studies. The most relevant to the theme of this study 
are those that explore issues related to the 2007-2008 
PEV in Kenya. Perhaps the best place to start is 
Andrew Reynold’s 2009 article entitled “Elections, 
Electoral Systems, and Conflict in Africa.”2 
Published a year after Kenya’s PEV, the article 
opines that elections are “not only transition points; 
they are repeatable moments that become critical to 
democratic development.”3 Reynolds argues that 
electoral systems are a significant reason why there 
is conflict in Africa. By his definition, electoral 
systems are how votes that are cast translate into 
seats. 
 The system also has the ability to create space for 
election frauds but can limit malfeasance. If there are 
no limits on the power of the winner of an election, 
Reynolds states, then elections themselves become a 
matter of life and death. In addition, post-election 
conflicts have often led to a peace settlement that 
sometimes includes power sharing—making the 
election seem unnecessary in the first place. If power 
sharing arrangement requires inclusion of minority 
and majority groups, then an electoral system might 
be designed to allow proportional representation. 
Reynolds proposes the Elklit-Reynolds Election 
Quality Assessment4 framework which measures the 
quality of an election. The resulting score (out of 
100) tells how high the administrative quality and 
institutional legitimacy of an election are. In Kenya’s 
case, the 2007 election scored 51, signaling an 
ineffective electoral system.  
 A much more Kenya-specific review of elections 
and conflict is the article by Marcel Rutten and Sam 
Owuor, appropriately entitled “Weapons of Mass 
Destruction: Land, Ethnicity and the 2007 Elections 
in Kenya.”5 In this paper, Rutten and Owour discuss 
the origins of conflict in Kenya, specifically conflict 
that occurs during election cycles. Land is identified 
as the main cause of conflicts, including land 
alienation from the colonial period, unfair land 
reallocation practices since independence, increased 
land pressure caused by the alienation, droughts and 
famine as well as the attempts to forcibly remove 
those ethnicities that are deemed interlopers. Rutten 
and Owuor further set the historical context, which 
they date to the late 1800s, to the early intra-ethnic 
conflicts of the Nilotic groups such as the Turkana, 
Samburu, Oromo and Maasai. In the post-
independence era, the land commission that was 
charged with the reallocation of White Settler lands 
did not return lands to the original communities; 
rather, the land was sold to the wealthy who were 
mostly Kikuyu. President Jomo Kenyatta himself 
took large parcels and awarded others to his closest 
friends and supporters. Dissatisfied communities 
later decided to take their ancestral lands back, 
evidenced in land clashes in 1993-1997 during the 
Moi era. In the view of Rutten and Owuor, on the 
surface the political parties were established based 
on ethnic cleavages; below the surface, however, 
many ethnic parties were also formed along land 
issues.6 These cleavages were also represented 
ideologically, for example, by Jaramogi Odinga 
urging his supporters not to pay for the land since it 
was theirs previously.  
 If, indeed, the media constitutes the political 
watchdog, how was the 2008 PEV covered? In their 
article entitled “Newspaper Coverage of Post 
Political Election Violence in Africa: An Assessment 
of the Kenyan Example,”7 Uche Onyebadi and Tayo 
Oyedeji provided some answers. The authors 
identify the main newspapers in Kenya: the Daily 
Nation and the East African Standard. By reviewing 
the types of stories the two main newspapers carried, 
the authors show that in the period running up to the 
election (October to November 2007), the largest 
percentage of front page news was on the election 
campaigns; there was none regarding conflict or the 
anticipation of conflict. From January 2008 (post-
election period), front page stories consisted of 50% 
peace meetings and only 3% were about violence. 
Segmenting further for individual publications, in the 
pre-election period, the Nation carried 20 stories 
while the Standard carried 32 stories. In the post-
election period, the Nation carried 6 stories on peace 
meetings and 4 on violence while the Standard 
carried 23 stories on peace meetings and none (zero) 
on violence. This indicates that, unlike the Rwandan 
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case where the media was seen to have driven 
violence, in Kenya the newspapers seemed to have 
“become vehicles for the propagation of peace in a 
troubled nation.”8 The authors also make the case for 
“peace journalism” which they described as 
journalism that is “oriented toward peace, truth, 
people and solutions to conflicts.”9 This is contrasted 
to “war journalism” which tends to report violence 
and its “attendant destruction.”10 
 A recurring subject in Kenyan and African PEV 
is the issue of impunity. After the 2008 PEV, one 
might ask, how many people have been tried, found 
guilty of major crimes against humanity, and 
punished? How many have been brought to justice? 
In the article provocatively entitled “The Big Fish 
Won’t Fry Themselves: Criminal Accountability for 
Post-Election Violence in Kenya,” Stephen Brown 
and Sandra Sriram discuss the reasons why Kenya 
has failed to bring about justice after post-election 
violence since the 1990s. They argue that Kenya’s 
efforts to transition politically have been stifled by 
the fact that those in power during the single party 
era are still in power now. These same individuals, 
the “big fish,” have been implicated in various 
commission reports (Akiwumi in 1992 and Waki in 
2008) but they have been able to exert their influence 
and have frustrated any actions to bring them to 
justice. The same was true after the 2007/2008 
election, but the Waki Commission was able to stem 
their influence by building in their report a self-
enforcement mechanism that resulted in the Kenyan 
case being referred to the ICC. Brown and Sriram 
explain this self-enforcement mechanism as follows: 
 
To pressure the government to adopt this 
recommendation, the Commission’s report contained 
an ingenious self-enforcing mechanism: if the 
government did not create the tribunal, the 
Commission’s chair would pass on evidence to the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and request that it 
become involved. Soon after the report was published, 
the government committed itself to the 
implementation of the report’s recommendations, 
including the creation of the Special Tribunal. The 
government never set up the tribunal, however. Efforts 
to present and pass a bill in Parliament failed on three 
separate occasions and have since been abandoned. 
Instead, the government regularly promised 
prosecutions in the national courts, but the likelihood 
of that actually taking place seems remote.11 
 
 Because of this issue of impunity and injustices 
that have piled up over the years, perhaps the 2007-
2008 violence was inevitable. Brown and Sriram 
argue that were it not for the “shadow of the ICC” 
then any attempts to have a hybrid tribunal 
established would not have materialized. The 
previous lack of accountability for those who 
perpetrated pre- and post-election violence had 
created an atmosphere of impunity that the ICC was 
attempting to break. They also argue that there has 
been a paradigm shift in the judicial and political 
action as well as the conversations that were sparked 
by the ICC’s involvement. For example, this has 
helped to create an independent judiciary and several 
actions taken by this new judiciary have helped build 
public trust. 
 To close out this literature review, it is important 
to note that Kenya has held elections regularly, every 
five years, since 1962. Nevertheless, Kenya is not 
considered to have achieved “democratic 
consolidation.” Admittedly, the elections held in the 
single-party era of authoritarianism and dictatorship 
did not count. Like many other countries in the 
region, multiparty democratic transitions began in 
the 1990s, but the elections have provoked violence, 
the 2007-2008 PEV being the most pugnacious. The 
literature on democratic consolidation is vast,12 
especially since the concept is usually applied 
globally.13 While all the indices of “consolidation” 
are still debated, peaceful, free and fair, and credible 
elections have been considered major ingredients. As 
developing countries began to emerge from 
authoritarian system in the 1990s, it became essential 
to differentiate “uncertain” from “certain” 
democracies. But, according to Steven Friedman, the 
democratic consolidation paradigm is “vague, 
teleological and ethnocentric and measures new 
democracies against an idealised understanding of 
Northern liberal democracies.”14 In essence, and as 
will be revealed in this paper, even with its fifty-year 
experience of elections Kenya is not counted among 
“consolidated,” “certain” democracies partly 
because of the history of post-electoral violence and 
the dearth of democratic institutions, and partly 
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because political power has merely circulated among 
the same group of political elite.15 
 
KENYA’S 2013 GENERAL ELECTIONS: 
HOW UHURU KENYATTA BECAME PRESIDENT 
 
It was months after the 2013 elections before the 
IEBC released the final poll results, causing great 
discomfort among Kenya’s political elites. When the 
figures were eventually presented to Parliament, 
IEBC officials—Chairman Isack Hassan and CEO 
James Oswago—refused to take the oath.16 The 
released figures claimed that the total votes cast in 
the presidential election were 12,330,028 of which 
12, 221,053 were valid; of these valid votes, 
Kenyatta received 6,173,433 and Raila 5,340,546, 
the difference being 832,887 votes. The IEBC also 
established that “Kenyatta crossed the constitutional 
threshold of 50 percent plus one with just over 4,000 
votes.”17 
 How then did Uhuru Kenyatta become elected 
president of Kenya in 2013? What were the 
implications of his election for the sustenance of 
post-electoral peace in Kenya? We posit that the 
election of Uhuru Kenyatta and the achievement of 
post-electoral peace in Kenya are interrelated. 
However, this is not to suggest that there would have 
been violence if Kenyatta were not declared winner. 
Rather, it is to argue that the combination of factors 
in the period leading up to the election predict and 
assure peaceful transition. Several of these factors 
will be presented and discussed in this paper. Of 
these, the most important factor for the election of 
Uhuru Kenyatta was the formation of a winning 
coalition, the Jubilee Alliance, by Kikuyu and 
Kalenjin leaders, placing Uhuru Kenyatta and 
(Kikuyu) and Ruto (Kalenjin) on the same ticket.  
 The formation of what came to be called the 
Jubilee Alliance followed the pattern of limited-
purpose politico-ethnic alliance which had 
characterized Kenya’s electoral history. However, 
the Jubilee Alliance was unique in a number of 
ways—and it was almost unexpected. Under its 
umbrella, the two ethnic groups that were at the 
center of the 2007-08 PEV, the Kikuyu and Kalenjin, 
came together. 
 In the 2007 elections, the Kalenjin were pitted 
against the Kikuyu in the parties and coalitions. 
Kibaki’s political party, the Party of National Unity 
(PNU), was composed of majority Kikuyu while the 
main opposition party, the Orange Democratic 
Movement (ODM), was a mix of ethnicities from 
Western Kenya, of which the Kalenjin is a part. In 
2007, it was believed, the Kalenjin were seeking to 
remove the Kikuyu from the Rift Valley. On 
December 29, 2007, the Electoral Commission of 
Kenya (ECK) declared Kibaki winner, and he was 
sworn in shortly thereafter at midnight. The pent-up 
anger mixed with emotions that the votes had been 
stolen, and violence irrupted immediately. 
 In the new Jubilee Coalition, Uhuru Kenyatta and 
William Ruto were nominated to contest for the 
positions of President and Deputy President 
respectively, positions that they now occupy at the 
time of writing. By joining forces, not only did they 
ensure a win, but this coalition also forced the two 
groups to come together in a show of unity. This can 
be argued to be a major cause of the subsequent 
relatively peaceful elections and the peaceful 
handling of the post-election petitions. The question 
is: How long would this alliance last, especially if the 
underlying ethnic and land issues remain 
unaddressed? 
 
FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR POST-ELECTION 
PEACE IN 2013 
 
A good place to start this evaluation of Kenya’s 
peaceful post-election dispute management is the 
election management body (EMB) itself.18 
Established in accordance with the new constitution 
of 2010, the Independent Electoral and Boundaries 
Commission (IEBC) was created in part because of 
the failure of the Interim Independent Electoral 
Commission of Kenya (IIEC) which had 
administered the previous election. The IIEC proved 
to be corruptible, and the manner in which it released 
the election results of 2007 was the immediate cause 
of the outbreak of violence. Prior to the general 
election of 2013 the new EMB, the IEBC, was able 
to prove itself to the public by administering several 
by-elections. The successful manner in which these 
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by-elections were conducted created a sense of 
confidence towards the IEBC regarding its ability 
and fairness. As stated by Najib, a high-ranking 
official of the IEBC, “more than 86% of Kenyans had 
full confidence in the Commission [and that it] would 
conduct free and fair elections.” 
 Nevertheless, the IEBC was faced with enormous 
challenges. One of these was the requirement to 
register more than 14 million voters within 30 days. 
This required technology that the IEBC did not have 
at the time. The IEBC had to acquire this technology 
in short order through a process that turned out to be 
flawed. In the end, an intervention by former 
President Kibaki and former Prime Minister Odinga 
secured the necessary technology through a 
“Canadian government loan in the amount of $68.1 
million.”19 
 The IEBC’s tasks also included the registration 
of political parties as mandated by the Kenyan 
constitution20 and the Elections Act of 2011. This act 
sets forth all regulations pertaining to the running of 
an election from the methods by which the county 
returning officers were appointed to the means by 
which pre-election disputes are to be resolved. 
Considering the magnitude of the task ahead, the 
IEBC worked closely with assistance from the 
International Foundation of Electoral Systems. The 
process required the registration of 59 political 
parties and millions of voters based on the Political 
Parties Act of 2011.21 To streamline this otherwise 
laborious process, the IEBC empowered political 
parties to enter the necessary data on their own. 
However, decentralizing this process did cause some 
concerns because some political parties were 
accused of falsifying their member rosters to meet 
the requirements. There were numerous incidents of 
Kenyans being registered without their knowledge 
which led to the generation of the hash tag 
#FakePartyMembersKe as a means of bringing 
attention to the matter. There was also the allegation 
that members were transferred from one party to 
another.22 To address these concerns, the IEBC 
created an online platform where voters were able to 
verify the parties with which they were registered. 
Also, the IEBC created an email address where 
complaints regarding this and related matters could 
be lodged. Finally, the IEBC placed a warning on its 
website that “it is an offense punishable by law for 
any political party to register a member without his 
or her knowledge. Any party doing so could be 
deregistered and penalized.”23  
 The IEBC worked hard to ensure impartiality in 
all its operations, especially at the grassroots level. 
The Carter Center, one of the international observer 
groups, lauded the IEBC for its transparency. In its 
preliminary report issued shortly after the election, 
the Carter Center finds “that Kenya’s polls were 
well-conducted in a peaceful environment. Voter 
turnout appears to have been high. The Independent 
Electoral and Boundaries Commission has made 
important commitments to improve the transparency 
of the counting and tabulation of votes.”24 Also, 
according to Najib, IEBC officials made every effort 
to remain impartial and professional to the extent that 
they did not vote in the election. The IEBC employed 
returning officers who were trained in the rules and 
regulations pertaining to the tasks they would be 
carrying out. Furthermore, to ensure impartiality, the 
IEBC did not post any returning officers to their 
home districts or original location of their ethnicity. 
The officers and clerks were also trained in 
alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to act on 
behalf of the IEBC. These officers were empowered 
to report any circumstances that could likely lead to 
armed conflict.  
 Many organizations joined in the IEBC’s efforts 
to mitigate conflict. These include the Kenya Human 
Rights Commission and the National Cohesion and 
Integration Commission whose aim is to “facilitate 
and promote a Kenyan society whose values are 
harmonious and non-discriminatory for a peaceful 
co-existence and integration.”25 Together they were 
able to establish a text message hotline where 
inflammatory speeches could be reported 
anonymously. Monitoring hate speech is crucial. 
Hate speech was identified as a primary means of 
inciting armed conflict in the 2007 election 
campaign. In addition, there were senior Deputy 
Police Commissioners who were attached to the 
IEBC which facilitated quicker responses to reports 
of conflict or potential conflict. Peace committees 
were established both at the county and national 
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levels, and their function was to facilitate forums at 
which political parties and the IEBC could discuss 
concerns that could lead to conflict. The committees 
at the county level were headed by a village 
headman, a designation that likely gave them a sense 
of legitimacy in the communities.  
 Another challenge that the IEBC faced was in the 
management of expectations.26 One of those 
expectations was that the results of presidential vote 
would be available soon after all polling stations 
were closed and that all results would be transmitted 
electronically. The latter was of great significance 
since Kenya has a history of electoral irregularities. 
A major source of post-election violence was the 
claim that the election had been stolen by means of 
rigging, ballot stuffing, number swapping, and other 
irregularities. Having the ability to report polling 
station results directly and electronically provided a 
secure and timely means with which the IEBC could 
wrap up the process. However, several errors 
occurred on the day of election, including the 
malfunctioning of voting machines, and the failure to 
transmit the results electronically as initially 
planned. Many polling stations had to revert to the 
manual voter lists as well as manual casting of 
ballots. Consequently, the provisional results did not 
arrive as expected. Instead, the returning officers had 
to travel to the central tallying location late at night 
with the paper results. The resultant delay heightened 
tension and promoted mistrust of the IEBC.27  
 Despite these imperfections in the conduct of the 
election by the IEBC, Kenyans have largely accepted 
the results and have chosen the paths of peaceful 
resolution rather than violence. What was 
responsible for the relatively peaceful election and 
non-violent handling of post-election disputes in 
2013? Thematic analysis of the interviews reveals six 
major factors. These factors were not ranked but 
respondents identified them very frequently. They 
were: 
 recent memory of post-election violence; 
 several years of peace activism; 
 the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
(TJRC); 
 the shadow of the International Criminal Court (ICC); 
 the new constitution; and 
 the Supreme Court 
Recent Memory of Post-Election Violence 
 
A major explanation for the peaceful post-election 
dispute handling in 2013 was the horror of the 
immediate past post-election violence. Several 
interviewees expressed the desire to never see or 
experience another PEV. This “never again!” attitude 
was shared by many Kenyans. Peter stated that there 
were intentional actions taken to ensure that violence 
of the 2007-08 scale never broke out again. Some of 
these initiatives were government-sponsored, others 
were sponsored by individuals and faith groups. 
Najib expatiated thus: 
 
Kenyans had learned a lesson from 2007/2008. I think 
there was that “collective will” you can say by the 
nation that never again will we go back to the brink of 
civil war. And so it became a civic duty of everybody, 
whether you are a small person, you are a community 
leader, you are a Pastor, you are an Imam, you are a 
political leader, a professional society, media; 
everybody took it upon themselves to make sure that 
this time around we don’t go back to where we came 
from in 2007/2008.28 
 
Several Years of Peace Activism 
 
Following the violent outcome of the 2007 elections, 
there was a proliferation of peace activism. Naomi 
gave extensive information on the work done by her 
organization and several others. These organizations 
mobilized the populace for peace. Some were 
secular, others were religious; some efforts were 
promoted by the government, others by the civil 
society. Many efforts—from religious sermons to 
speeches, from music to art, from parental caution to 
friendly commentaries on Facebook—were geared 
toward peace. A few individual and group efforts 
deserve mention. 
 Luke stated that individuals were significant in 
the process of civic education and selling the 
message of peace alongside the various 
organizations. Many individuals took on the cause of 
peace activism. A good example was Eric Wainaina, 
whose song “Daima Kenya” was played repeatedly 
on the radio and television to preach the message of 
peace. There were other avenues used like a musical 
released by Eric Wainaina that criticized the issues 
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of ethnicity and how politicians have used this to 
divide and conquer. There was also a concert that 
was out together with the support of the Kenya Red 
Cross, called “Chagua Peace” (Choose Peace). The 
idea was for all who attended to come in shirts that 
showed the party they supported. This was intended 
to show that regardless of the party one supported, 
being Kenyan was greater than the election and the 
tensions that have come with it. Another individual 
effort was by Boniface Mwangi whose photographic 
depictions of what happened in 2007-08 were a part 
of civic education and sensitization. For the purposes 
of ensuring a wider reach and to educate the public 
on civic matters, peace activists used the radio and 
local theaters. Radio DJs used their art to promote 
peace education especially targeting the youths and 
other important segments of their audience. In 
addition to promoting peace, these media educated 
the populace about the duty of the electorate, the role 
of government, and what the electorate should expect 
of their representatives. 
 In addition to individuals, groups, especially 
religious groups, also engaged in peace activism. The 
church had been chided for its role in the 2007-08 
PEV for failing to engage the public as it should 
have. Kenya is 80% Christian. Thus, the church and 
its leadership occupy a very powerful position in the 
community. As articulated by Naomi, pastors and 
bishops are taken seriously by the communities they 
lead; their words result in collective action.  
 It is important to understand that, in 2007-08, the 
attackers and those they attacked were churchgoers. 
The church was in a precarious position, and it 
seemed to have lost its grips on the good 
neighborliness of its congregation. On the one hand, 
when the violence broke out following the 2007 
elections, the churches were places of sanctuary for 
those escaping the violence. On the other hand, 
individual churches were targets of the perpetrators 
of violence; there was the tragedy of the church in 
Kiambaa that was burned to the ground with women 
and children in it.29 According to Pius, local pastors 
and bishops placed urgent calls to their superiors in 
Nairobi, requesting assistance due to the 
overwhelming numbers of IDPs in their compounds. 
As a body, the church rose up to the challenge of 
providing immediate humanitarian relief as well as 
longer-term soul searching. A bus tour was 
organized and it consisted of church leaders and its 
qualified lay people. Pius made a specific reference 
to their arrival at the grounds of the International 
Agricultural Show of Kenya (ISK) in Nakuru and 
seeing “a sea of people who were displaced and 
living in terrible conditions.”30 He went on to note 
that due to the poor public perception of the church 
at the time, they opted not to wear their collars or any 
other items that may identify them as church leaders. 
The fear was that if they were recognized, those they 
were attempting to reach would not be willing to 
receive them or the help they were bringing. In 
general the church was perceived as a moral failure.  
 These bus tours resulted in the re-establishment 
of the church as a legitimate leader in the community 
and consequently in the country. Also due to these 
continuous outreaches by the church to the displaced, 
members of the public were willing to listen when 
the church began to address the issues that led to the 
armed conflict and began to preach the message of 
peace. In 2012, there were reports of churches 
hosting political leaders, security officials, and other 
community leaders in their services as part of 
spreading the message of peace.  
 Naomi, one of the participants in the study, works 
for an organization that came into being at the behest 
of church leaders. The interviewee stated that, as a 
lawyer and an active church member, it became 
apparent that the church needed those in the legal 
profession to assist in presenting its case to the 
government and the public. The organization has 
been responsible for numerous training programs 
especially in the locations where the violence was at 
its worst in 2007-08. As a non-church body but one 
made up of Christians, they were able to voice 
opinions and carry messages on behalf of the church 
but from a legal perspective. 
 The pursuit of peace in the period before the 2013 
election covered the issue of hate speech. One of the 
major concerns was about hate speech and the media. 
George, a journalist and a participant in this study, 
stated that journalists were extremely cautious in 
how they reported any stories, news, or anything to 
do with the election. He further stated that journalists 
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were required to take sensitivity training so they 
would be aware of how others might interpret the 
news and reports being delivered via any media 
outlets. Isaiah, one of the participants in this study, 
commented on this self-censorship of the media and 
labelled the situation “Silence! Peace in progress.” In 
his opinion, peace trumped truth and justice. 
 
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
(TJRC) 
 
The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
was established for the express purposes of giving 
Kenyans the space to air the injustices done to them 
by the Government, government officials or with the 
complicity of the authorities. Its final report was 
published in May 2013 after more than 6 years of 
gathering information from Kenyans across the 
country. The commission was established to promote 
peace, justice, national unity, healing, reconciliation 
and dignity among the people of Kenya.  
 Ordinary Kenyans testified of injustices 
committed against them regardless of who was 
implicated. Victims of PEV felt that the Kenyan 
government was finally listening to them. According 
to Moses, there were expressions of relief by people 
who came to testify before the TJRC: 
 
There were some people who came up and spoke with 
us after [their testimony]. They [said], “We are 
relieved. Thank you.” [We asked], “What do you 
want? What would you like the state to do?” They 
[replied], “I don’t want anybody to do anything. I have 
spoken and for the first time since the last 20, 30 years; 
I’ve not had a chance. I am free now. I’m ok. I’m 
finished with it.” 
 
 This statement indicates the impact of the TJRC 
on the peace process. People and communities were 
able to testify at the TJRC hearings. Many 
interviewees for this study cite the TJRC as a major 
factor in the peaceful post-election dispute handling 
of 2013. As Moses stated, tensions were also known 
to flare up into conflict because those who were 
wronged did not feel that they had a means to redress. 
With the TJRC providing a place for them to give 
voice to their story, they were able to get past it and 
to move on with their lives. 
Shadow of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
 
The role of the ICC in Kenya’s politics created a 
sense of urgency and was probably a major factor in 
the creation of the Jubilee Alliance. This can be 
referred to as an unintended consequence of ICC 
intervention. As Isaiah described it, the indictment 
by the ICC of the presidential candidates on the 
Jubilee Alliance ticket for crimes against humanity 
“raised the stakes in the election quite a bit . . . the 
ICC introduced a dynamic in the electoral process 
that in a sense implied that you either run for 
elections and win and find a way of dealing with the 
ICC or you don’t run and your fate is sealed at The 
Hague.” It is arguable that the winning coalition used 
the ICC issue as a tool for political mobilization. This 
is a sentiment echoed by Isaiah who stated that 
“[T]here is a sense in which elections were 
interpreted by a segment of society that the 
international criminal court case against President 
Uhuru and his Deputy William Ruto was designed to 
prevent them from exercising their right to run for 
office and therefore perhaps even becoming the 
President.” Also, according to Sarah, a contestant in 
the 2013 election, this pressure was polarizing to the 
electorate to the extent that, “there were not many 
people willing to discuss the ICC issue.” Still on the 
same issue, Luke, one of Kenya’s top musicians and 
a peace activist, stated that the public sentiment 
could have created the momentum upon which the 
Jubilee Alliance’s election campaign was built 
because it “galvanized support for them.” 
 Ironically, the ICC fire has burnt out; there 
remains only one active case of the original six—the 
case against current Vice President William Ruto. 
There is the possibility that the case against President 
Uhuru Kenyatta will be dropped due to insufficient 
evidence. This current state of affairs may have 
inadvertently made the ICC appear illegitimate and 
irrelevant since it was initially meant to address those 
who were “above the law,” those who could not be 
touched by their country’s legal processes because of 
the culture of impunity. With the Jubilee Alliance 
winning the 2013 election, and the vacillations by the 
ICC in its prosecution of President Uhuru Kenyatta, 
it seems that the ICC case has lost steam. It appears 
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that, by electing Kenyatta and Ruto, Kenyan voters 
had also rendered the ICC powerless. 
 
The New Constitution 
 
All the participants in this study credited the new 
constitution with Kenya’s ability to resolve the 2013 
post-election dispute peacefully. Several 
interviewees discussed the lack of trust that existed, 
especially since Kibaki had appointed several judges 
to the Supreme Court and high courts right before the 
2007 election. The ODM leadership did not feel that 
they would have been able to get an impartial and fair 
ruling had they gone to court in 2008. So, ODM 
supporters opted to take their discontent to the 
streets.  
 The new Constitution not only provided a way 
out, it also set time limits on the hearings. 
Historically, Kenya’s judicial process has been 
tortuously slow. According to Naomi, the new 
guidelines set in place were both beneficial but they 
also presented a challenge: 
 
The general populace are quiet happy with the 
constitution because they imagine(d) that it (was) 
going to block things that happened before… Now 
many people are starting to open their eyes to the fact 
that those things we thought were being solved are 
actually not being solved. Take a case in point, what’s 
going on with the Senate and the National assembly. 
We imagined that by creating an extra chamber of 
parliament and that having more people in government 
would put some (oversight) on the power of the 
President. Yes we have more people but there are no 
checks and balances because (of) the way it was 
described in the constitution . . . .  
 
The Supreme Court 
 
The Supreme Court was overhauled with the 
promulgation of the 2010 Constitution. The 
Constitution enumerated the process through which 
the judges to the various courts would be selected.31 
This was a move that required the input of the 
Judicial Service Commission and the National 
Assembly.  
 The appointments to this court were disrupted by 
some disputes ranging from the legality of the 
appointments to the criteria used to select the 
justices. The process served as a means to create 
transparency and accountability, something that was 
missing at the time of the 2007 election. As stated by 
Najib, “This new constitution had created . . . a new 
judiciary which was now independent with a 
Supreme Court and a new Chief Justice. And the 
manner of appointment of . . . the judges in the 
judiciary was also transparent and open, no longer 
just at the preserve of the president. And so the level 
of faith and confidence of the people in these 
institutions was very high going towards the 
elections.” The general public was confident that the 
newly established Supreme Court was capable of 
handling post-election disputes and petitions with 
impartiality and openness and “so the temptation to 
go to the streets was reduced extremely.”32 In 
addition, several cases had been handled by the new 
Supreme Court with outcomes that made it clear that 
it was independent of any undue influence. In sharp 
contrast to the 2007 elections, the public sentiment 
was that the judiciary at the time was not transparent 
and was a puppet of the President. In addition, the 
2013 post-election dispute proceedings at the 
Supreme Court were televised which allowed the 
public to see what was happening in the courtroom. 
That was the first time this had happened in Kenya 
and it served as to boost the public’s confidence 
significantly. 
 In a lecture delivered at the Colloquium for the 
Selected Bench of the Judiciary Working Committee 
on Election Preparations, held at the Great Rift 
Valley Lodge, Naivasha, on April 23, 2013, Hon 
Justice J. B. Ojwang, Justice of the Supreme Court of 
Kenya, explained the significance of Kenya’s dispute 
handling strategy following the 2013 election: 
 
. . . [The] issue regarding election to the Presidential 
office relates directly to the question whether the 
Kenyan State will be in a position to discharge the vital 
functions of the Executive Branch. It means, a dispute 
relating to Presidential election is infinitely more 
sensitive: as it will affect the country’s standing in 
terms of the management of the State’s internal 
affairs, and will have a bearing on Kenya’s fulfilment 
of her international mandate. At the level of the 
Presidency, therefore, there is an exceptional interest 
in the integrity and legitimacy of the election, both at 
home and abroad.33 
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 Justice Ojwang went on to say that the Supreme 
Court took cognizance of these need for sensitivity 
in its hearings and ruling on the Supreme Court 
Election Petition No. 5 of 2013. According to him, 
 
Since such electoral disputes will fall at the doors of 
the Judiciary, the Courts must not only take judicial 
notice of the foregoing realities, but go further and 
adopt general guidelines that embody fairness, 
practicality and legitimacy, for dealing with the 




As this paper clearly demonstrates, the changeover 
from the 2008 post-election violence (PEV) to the 
2013 post-election peace (PEP) has been remarkable. 
Several questions still remain. The first is the 
sustainability of the peace that was exhibited in the 
elections of 2013. Will this peace endure for the 2017 
and subsequent elections? It can be argued that, 
currently, a state of negative peace exists because of 
the heavy police presence in the slums, where 
violence had been severe in 2008. Will civil society 
organizations (CSOs) be able to sustain their peace 
programs at the level, scale, and frequency seen in 
the 2008-2013 period? According to Barnabas, one 
of the participants in this study, Kenyan CSOs are 
largely dependent on donor funding which can be 
unpredictable. In addition, so far the political elites 
have been unwilling to have the tough conversations 
that would address historical injustices. For instance, 
President Uhuru Kenyatta hails from the very 
wealthy Kenyatta family which obtained its wealth 
by taking possession of large tracts of resource rich 
land. It was not surprising that when the TJRC was 
ready to issue its final report in 2013, the report was 
edited to exclude these subjects.35 The issue of land 
and other historical injustices have since been pushed 
to the National Land Commission (NLC) Taskforce 
on Historical Land Injustices chaired by Samuel 
Tororei.36 
 Devolution is another issue that may impact the 
sustainability of the PEP in the long term. At the time 
of writing this paper, there were at least three (3) 
county boundary disputes with several deaths 
already reported in one dispute.37 These disputes 
indicate that the process of devolution is not as 
certain as the constitution meant it to be. In addition 
to these boundary disputes, members of the CORD 
coalition have called for a constitutional referendum 
and the disbandment of the IEBC, claiming that the 
electoral management body (EMB) botched the 2013 
election.38 This means that even though it is being 
implemented as envisaged in the constitution, 
devolution is not a permanent solution to ethno-
political crises. One of the issues surrounding the 
sustainability of devolution is the current electoral 
set up which entails having six elections in one day. 
The second, and larger, issue is how expensive 
devolution has turned out to be. The National Budget 
has currently allocated to the counties an amount of 
USD 2.7 billion annually ($1=Ksh 85) which is 15 
percent of the budget. However the referendum 
(which was in progress at the time of writing) 
demanded an increase to 45 percent of the national 
budget, costing about $9.5 billion.39 Considering that 
Kenya’s budget runs at a deficit of 4.5% of its annual 
gross domestic product (2014),40 then implementing 
this would present a challenge to the overall 
economy.  
 A long-term question raised and discussed at 
great lengths by participants in this study is: What 
lessons can the rest of Africa learn from Kenya’s 
peaceful handling of its post-election disputes in 
2013, just one general election after the post-election 
violence of 2008? Several interviewees stressed the 
need for independent institutions, especially EMBs. 
Incidentally, Najib and Martha are in full agreement 
on this issue, despite their opposing views and 
backgrounds. Their view and that of others is that one 
of the main contributing factors to the post-election 
violence in 2008 was the perception that ECK, the 
then EMB, was corrupt and that it was in the 
“pockets” of the incumbent President Kibaki. 
However, the establishment of the IEBC brought 
rays of hope; subsequently, the IEBC earned trust 
and credibility in the manner it managed the by-
elections that took place before the general elections. 
So far, the IEBC has survived rigorous criticism. 
Doing a better job of the 2017 election might not only 
promote electoral sustainability, but also forestall 
another PEV and reinforce democracy in Kenya.  
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 Another institution that was cited severally was 
the Judiciary. An independent and impartial judiciary 
is important to make decisions when election results 
are disputed. The Kenyan public was willing to trust 
the new, reformed judiciary.  
 Lastly, while the institution of the Executive had 
been fairly stable since independence, it had become 
a source of conflict as the location of wealth and 
power. Winning the presidency became the goal of 
political elites and their backers. Devolving and 
redistributing these powers to the counties is 
expected to reduce acrimonious competition, the 
kind that led to violence in 2008. 
 This brings us to the final point. In researching 
this paper we found through the numerous interviews 
and available literature that there is an underlying 
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